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Economic Perspective 2 
THE 1 9 8 0 ' s SCOTTISH PROOJCTIVm BOOH; GOOD NEUS OR BAD ? 
Frank Kirwan & Peter McGregor 
Fraser Inst i tute 
One of the most s t r ik ing features of the 
Scott ish and UK economies has been the 
sustained increase in labour productivity 
in manufacturing since the la t ter part of 
1980. The "productivity boom" has been 
less marked in Scotland than in the UK as 
a whole, but has none the less been 
significant. Is the productivity boom good 
or bad news for the Scott ish economy ? 
The official view is that the increase in 
labour productivity reflects in some sense 
a strengthening of the economy. This view 
may indeed be an important element in the 
official, but nonetheless erroneous, view 
that Scotland i s "leading the UK out of 
recession". 
P roduc t iv i ty t y p i c a l l y tends to r i s e 
during the recovery phase of the cycle as 
firms respond to an upturn in demand by 
u s i n g t h e i r l a b o u r f o r c e s mere 
e f f i c i e n t l y . This in t u rn tends to 
moderate inflationary pressures during the 
upturn. In previous cycl ical upturns 
r is ing productivity has ref lected the 
transitory effect of rising output against 
a background of l e s s r a p i d l y r i s i n g 
employment . Recent i n c r e a s e s i n 
p roduc t i v i t y do not conform t o t h i s 
pattern. During the productivity boom of 
the 1980*s manufacturing output has been 
s t a t i c or f a l l ing while manufacturing 
employment has actual ly been fa l l ing . 
Recent increases in productivity should 
not therefore be in terpreted as "good 
news". 
Similarly, the Treasury interpretation of 
the productivity figures as an indication 
that labour as a whole, and union labour 
in particular, has become more efficient 
due, for example, to the l e s s r i g i d 
application of the union rule book, seems 
inconsistent with recent experience. For, 
given competitive product markets - which 
the government assumes to some degree -
greater f l e x i b i l i t y in the use of labour 
should s t imulate permanent employment 
gains through reduced product prices and 
increased sales. Under such circumstances 
employment gains should accompany the 
productivity increases. Once again the 
experience of Scott ish manufacturing in 
the 1980's would seem to be a t variance 
with t h i s "good news" in te rpre ta t ion of 
productivity gains. 
I t may be objected that our interpretation 
i s naive in tha t the environment of the 
late 1970's and early 1980's i s sometimes 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d as one of r a p i d l y 
d e t e r i o r a t i n g , e x t e r n a l l y imposed 
macroeconomic conditions. On th i s view, 
the productivity boom merely mitigated the 
worst effects of these conditions. The 
problem with t h i s in te rpre ta t ion , other 
than t h a t of f ind ing a s u f f i c i e n t l y 
sustained and severe external influence 
over the 1980's, i s tha t the "good news" 
i s not real ly very good a t a l l . Things 
are not going to get any worse once 
adjustment i s complete , but un less 
external forces , which are presumably 
u n c o n t r o l l a b l e s ince they were not 
i n i t i a l l y offset , reverse the adverse 
pressures, things are not going to get any 
better e i ther . 
Scepticism concerning the arguments of the 
"good news" camp should not necessarily be 
interpreted as implying that firms, given 
the state of the economy, could or should 
have behaved differently. The employment 
s i t u a t i o n m i g h t , t h r o u g h induced 
bankruptcies, have been much worse in the 
absence of the productivity boom. But 
such a view i s quite consistent with the 
a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the 
productivity boom considered below. 
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In some circles productivity increases are 
viewed as unambiguously "bad news", some 
sections of organised labour, for example, 
fear that productivity gains assoicated 
with new technology automatically imply 
job losses . While such a view might be 
justified in a world in which firms could 
not expand sales, this is patently not the 
case in an open economy such as Scotland. 
There a r e , however, l e s s extreme 
a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e "good news" 
in terpre ta t ion of the productivity boom 
which are more plausible. 
Amongst these i s the poss ib i l i ty that 
firms have simply become more pessimistic 
about the longer term prospects for the 
economy. Firms hoard labour in a downturn 
in the expectation that sales will pick up 
subsequently. By hoarding, firms avoid 
the c o s t s of f i r i n g and r e - h i r i n g . 
However, if a recession persists, contrary 
to i n i t i a l expectations, firms begin to 
q u e s t i o n t h e i r l o n g e r te rm s a l e s 
p rospec t s . Downward r e v i s i o n s of 
projected sales will lead to the shedding 
of hoarded labour so increasing labour 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . The conventional pro-
cyclical pattern of productivity change, 
which is dependent on firms having a given 
state of long run sales expectations, i s 
then broken (See Buiter & Miller; 1983). 
On th i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the r e s u l t i n g 
productivity boom i s "bad news" since i t 
primarily r e f l ec t s firms' adjustment to 
more p e s s i m i s t i c l o n g - r u n s a l e s 
expec t a t i ons . Once a d j u s t m e n t i s 
complete, however, the productivity gains 
cease - as do the employment losses which 
generate them. On this interpretation the 
boom is "bad" but transitory. 
Taking this idea a l i t t l e further, i t may 
be that firms have not simply revised 
downwards their future sales expectations, 
but have in addition become more uncertain 
about the future course of sa les . Under 
such circumstances, firms will become much 
more cautious and seek to render the i r 
inputs much more "flexible". Two obvious 
ways of doing t h i s are to subs t i tu te 
female for male workers and increasingly 
use part-timers. 
Additionally, labour not directly involved 
in the production process may be shed and 
the requisite services hired instead from 
an outside agency. Such s p e c i a l i s e d 
agencies serving a number of firms have 
much g rea t e r oppor tun i t ies to spread 
var ia t ions in the demand for labour than 
does an individual firm employing i t s own 
employees. This view implies that labour 
hoarding should be much less marked in 
subsequent cycles. 
This "reallocation hypothesis" if correct, 
implies that the recorded productivity 
gains in the manufacturing sector are 
illusory, and simply reflect the shedding 
of overhead type labour from manufacturing 
and i t s absorbtion into the services 
sector. This view is certainly consistent 
with recent Scott ish Employment trends, 
(See the Labour Market sections of the 
QEC). Such rea l loca t ion may have been 
encouraged by a tax regime which 
encourages leasing of plant and equipment 
rather than outr ight purchase. Leased 
equipment tends to be maintained on 
contract by the leasor so that leasing 
r e s u l t s in a rea l locat ion of labour from 
the manufacturing to the service sector. 
E m p l o y e r s ' n a t i o n a l i n s u r a n c e 
contributions and pension obligations tend 
to produce a s imilar effect , making i t 
l e ss a t t r ac t i ve to take on employees to 
p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s w h i c h can be 
subcontracted such as cleaning, catering, 
etc. This hypothesis implies that, until 
p r e s su re s for real locat ion s t a b i l i s e , 
measured productivity in manufacturing 
wi l l continue to r i s e and thereafter 
remain permanently higher than before. 
From the viewpoint of the economy as a 
whole, the effect of the real locat ion 
would be at best neutra l , and cer ta inly 
could not be interpreted as "good news". 
A further possible explanation of the 
labour productivity boom i s that the price 
of labour r e l a t ive to other inputs has 
changed in such a way as to induce 
subst i tu t ion away from labour and in 
favour of other inputs. Where labour i s 
combined with increased quant i t ies of 
other inputs, measured productivity wi l l 
increase. However, t h i s would merely 
r e f l ec t firms' attempts to reduce the 
labour input associated with any given 
l e v e l of output and so could not be 
interpreted as "good news". There is some 
evidence that increases in the r e l a t ive 
price of energy and raw material inputs 
caused a shift in favour of labour during 
the 1970's (Lindbeck-,1983). Recent 
of that process. 
Final ly, but not exhaustively, i t seems 
l i k e l y t ha t firm c lo su re s may be 
76 
concentrated among the lowest productivity 
f i r m s , so t h a t the r i s e in measured 
productivity merely reflects a truncation 
of the distribution of existing firms (See 
Buiter & Miller; 1983). Whatever the cause 
of recent employment reductions, i t seems 
likely that contracting firms endeavour to 
shed their least productive labour f i rs t . 
The " p r o d u c t i v i t y boom" on t h e s e 
interpretations i s "bad news" in the sense 
t h a t i t i s a d i r e c t consequence of 
falling employment. To the extent that a 
recovery increases employment again, the 
p r o d u c t i v i t y boom i s l i k e l y to be 
reversed. 
In summary, t h e r e a re many pos s ib l e 
in te rp re ta t ions of the recent r i s e in 
measured productivity, a number of which 
have been sketched in this perspecive. No 
single explanation i s va l id , indeed many 
of the cand ida t e s can be viewed as 
complementary. However, the current 
o f f i c i a l v i ew, namely t h a t t h e 
p r o d u c t i v i t y boom i s both "good" and 
l ike ly to endure, i s by far the most 
favourable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r ecen t 
events. Whilst a proper evaluation of 
official wisdom on this issue must await 
more rigorous enquiry, casual empiricism 
suggests that, like the broader claim that 
"Scotland i s l ead ing the UK out of 
recession", i t should be received with 
considerable scepticism. 
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